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Inspection and Seizure of “Armed and Equipped” Somali 
Pirates: Lessons from the British and American  Anti-
Slavery Squadrons (1808-1860) 
John I. Winn, J.D., LL.M * 
What a glorious and advantageous trade this is. It is the hinge on 
which all the trade of this globe moves.1  (James Houston, eight-
eenth-century British slave merchant) 
When pirates are observed in boats with guns, ladders and even hos-
tages, it beggars belief that they cannot be prosecuted, assuming 
that states have the necessary laws in place and the will to do so.2  
(Richard Ottaway, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee-House of 
Commons) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the romanticized pirates of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, modern era Somali-based pirates represent a continuing threat 
to cargo, passenger, and deep-water fishing vessels in and around the 
Indian Ocean.  Estimates of per capita economic losses associated with 
these pirates range from $5 to $12 billion dollars per year.3  These asso-
ciated costs include, increased (i.e., inefficient) cruising speeds, re-
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 1. JAMES HOUSTOUN, MD, SOME NEW AND ACCURATE OBSERVATIONS OF GEOGRAPHICAL, 
NATURAL AND HISTORICAL. CONTAINING A TRUE AND IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION, 
PRODUCT, AND NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COAST OF GUINEA, SO FAR AS RELATES TO THE 
IMPROVEMENT OF THAT TRADE, FOR THE ADVANTAGE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN GENERAL, AND THE 
ROYAL AFRICA COMPANY IN PARTICULAR 44 (London, J. Peele 1725). 
 2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, H.C. at ¶ 81 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter PIRACY], available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/ 
cmfaff/1318/131802.htm 
 3. One Earth Future Foundation, The Economic Costs of Somali Piracy 2011 (2012) (working 
paper), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_20 
11.pdf. The overall losses when piracy in other regions is accounted for have been estimated to be 
$12 billion to $25 billion per year. Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to 
Combat This Critical National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 82 (2012). 
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routing of shipping lanes, security equipment, insurance, and ransoms for 
kidnapped crew-members.  While criminal prosecutions, armed security, 
and shipboard counter-piracy technologies are important factors in reduc-
ing the risk and efficacy of piratical attacks,4 the primary factor under-
pinning improved conditions off the Somali coast is an overwhelming 
multi-national armada involving up to fifty vessels from twenty-five 
countries. This effort is extravagantly expensive and almost certainly 
unsustainable over the long term.  Furthermore, even as various flotillas 
patrol the Somali coast, a ‘round-hole-square-peg’ legal infrastructure 
limits criminal prosecution of pirates to those relatively few pirates 
caught aboard seized vessels, who take or murder hostages, or are fool-
hardy enough to fire upon interdicting warships.5  A more practical solu-
tion, may be found in the historical precedent of the nineteenth century 
British and, to a lesser extent, American, anti-slavery naval squadrons.  
Much as active naval interdiction, inspection, and seizure of individual 
slave-ships effectively put an end to the Atlantic slave-trade by approxi-
mately 1850,6 putting an end to Somali piracy today may be as simple as 
stopping Somali Pirates one boat at a time. 
Although several hundred Indian Ocean pirates have been tried and 
imprisoned in recent years, pirate crews are equally likely to be fed and 
watered by intervening warships and set back afloat following legal con-
sultations.7 According to the Congressional Research Service, approxi-
mately 90% of pirates interdicted at sea are released without further ac-
tion.8  Pirates have also been reported to be using larger (hijacked) mer-
chant vessels as support vessels (i.e. “mother-ships”) and more seawor-
thy pursuit craft while ranging even further out to sea and westward to-
ward the coast of India.9 
Because criminal prosecutions are not currently feasible in Somalia, 
pirate trials in foreign prosecutorial states involve significant resource 
                                                
 4. See generally UK MARITIME TRADE OPERATIONS (UKMTO), BEST MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SOMALIA BASED PIRACY, BMP-4 (2011), available at 
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf. 
 5. UK Foreign Affairs: Analysis of Pirate “Catch and Release” off the Coast of Somalia, G-
CAPTAIN MARITIME NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://gcaptain.com/foreign-affairs-analysis-
pirate/ 
 6. 1850 marks the date that Brazil (which had refused to enforce the terms of its 1826 Treaty 
with Britain) agreed to allow British vessels to inspect its merchant vessels. Slave “smuggling” in 
smaller ships and in mixed cargo continued until approximately 1866. See generally KENNETH 
MORGAN, SLAVERY AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE: FROM AFRICA TO AMERICA (2008). 
 7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY, supra note 2. 
 8. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 27 (2011). 
 9. Somali Pirates Expand their Operations to West Coast of India, THE TIMES OF INDIA, (Nov. 
1, 2012), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-01/us/34857195_1_somali-pirates-
somali-piracy-pirate-attacks. 
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commitments, including prison building,10 transportation,11 witness trav-
el, and evidence collection. In April 2012, the British Foreign Office ad-
vised the Royal Navy to avoid detaining pirates of certain nationalities in 
view of the possibility that pirates may actually invoke claims for asylum 
under British law if their states of nationality use torture or allow execu-
tion as judicial punishment.12  Even if convicted outside of Somalia, pi-
rates returned for incarceration in Somalia are typically freed (or allowed 
to “escape”) after paying nominal bribes.13  In view of these and other 
considerations, coalition warships typically merely “observe” suspected 
pirate vessels while avoiding active interdiction unless pirates initiate 
aggressive action against other vessels.14 
In January 2011, the United Nations Secretary General noted “with 
concern that the domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions 
criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal 
prosecution of suspected pirates.”15  Currently, neither the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) nor the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS)16 sustain criminal jurisdiction over piracy or piracy-related 
offenses.  Although Article 3(1) of the 1988 Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA)17 partially fills this jurisdictional gap in ITLOS by invoking a 
universal obligation to either punish or extradite persons who commit 
                                                
 10. A Working Group on Legal Issues (WG2) under the International Contact Group on Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was tasked with increasing regional prosecutions and increasing 
post-sentencing prison capacity in Puntland and Somaliland. CGPCS was formed under U.N. Securi-
ty Council Resolution 1681 (Dec. 16, 2009) and involves 60 states and organizations under the lead-
ership of Denmark. Most prosecutions have taken place in Madagascar, Seychelles, and Kenya. See 
James Thuo Gathii, Kenya’s Piracy Prosecutions, 104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 416 (2010). 
 11. Captain David Reindorp (RN) provided the following testimony to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons: “You could be doing this 1,800 miles out into the Indian 
Ocean; it would take you five or six days to get a pirate back if you had to steam him back, and you 
may not want to send your one and only helicopter off to do that, because that might be better used 
looking out for and trying to deter and interdict pirate operations.” PIRACY, supra note 2, at 29. 
 12. Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum, THE SUNDAY TIMES (UK) (Apr. 13, 2008), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736239.ece. 
 13. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Estab-
lishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011). Accord-
ing to the report, more than sixty pirates were released from prison in Somaliland after bribe pay-
ments in 2011. 
 14. Press Release, U.S. Navy, Coalition Maritime Forces Deter Pirate Attack off Yemen (Dec. 
15, 2004), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/12/mil-041215-
nns03.htm. 
 15. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, to President of the Security Council, 
S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/191 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
 16. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982). 
 17. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Naviga-
tion, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention]. 
36 Seattle University Law Review SUpra [Vol. 36:33 
piratical offenses (while avoiding the use of the word “piracy”), SUA 
suffers from similar jurisdictional limitations.  Once a lawful boarding 
has taken place (with the permission of the vessel’s flag state), Article 6 
of SUA does not provide for any independent or prescriptive criminal 
jurisdiction.18  SUA likewise denies the capturing state the right to prose-
cute offenders without permission of the flag state.19 Prosecuting sus-
pected pirate-mariners who are merely found in boats armed and 
equipped for piratical attacks is problematic at best under both interna-
tional law and the domestic laws of prosecutorial states including the 
United States. 
In United States v. Said,20 Judge Raymond Jackson of the Eastern 
District Court of Virginia ordered the dismissal of piracy charges against 
six Somali nationals accused of attacking a Navy vessel in April 2010. 
The decision to dismiss was based upon a finding that because there was 
no actual “robbery at sea” as required under the 1820 Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Smith, there could be no “piracy.”21 Citing 
extensively from nineteenth-century jurisprudence, the court in Said not-
ed that “piracy” must be carefully distinguished from “mere piratical un-
dertakings,” which are not criminally punishable.22 Abdiwali Abdiqadir 
Muse, the sole surviving hijacker of the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009, 
pled guilty to various federal charges in the Southern District of New 
York, but prosecutors allowed the piracy charge to be dropped, possibly 
in light of concerns with legal definitional aspects of “piracy.”23 
Legal difficulties notwithstanding, the greater question for con-
cerned states remains the fundamental, long-term efficacy of prosecuting 
mere pirate underlings.  Warlord financiers certainly have no difficulty 
replacing these pirate foot soldiers in an impoverished failed state such 
as Somalia.  Jennifer Cooke, Africa Program Director for the Center for 
                                                
 18. For a summary of the discussion of the International Law Discussion Group at Chatham 
House, see Ship-Boarding: An Effective Measure Against Terrorism and WMD Proliferation?, 
CHATHAM HOUSE (Nov. 24, 2005), http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108131. 
 19. SUA Convention, art. 10 ¶1. 
 20. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 
2012). The six defendants were charged for opening fire on the USS Ashland from a small boat in 
April 2010. Id. at 556. The Ashland returned fire, sank the skiff and killed one of the occupants. Id. 
at 557. But see United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012). In the Dire opinion, the Fourth 
Circuit refused to accept the “static” definition of piracy from Said and held that 18 U.S.C. § 1651 
incorporated a definition of piracy that “changes with advancements in the law of nations.” Dire, 
680 F.3d at 469. 
 21. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 558–61 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); The 
Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1885)). 
 22. Id. at 560–61. 
 23. Ray Rivera & Benjamin Weiser, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hijacking of Cargo 
Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/19/nyregion/19pirate.html?_r=0. 
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Strategic and International Studies noted that “unless you get some solu-
tion on land, or cooperation from local authorities, this will just remain a 
problem that you can tamp down only occasionally.”24  Given Somalia’s 
three thousand kilometer coastline, any serious suppression effort must 
involve stopping and actually seizing pirate vessels large and small (in-
cluding mother-ships) found at sea armed and equipped for piracy.  Boat 
and ship seizures would have to be conducted regardless of whether or 
not the crew members found aboard are detained for criminal charges or 
merely set back on the shore. 
Toward these ends, a highly successful nineteenth-century model 
for multinational maritime criminal interdiction is instructive.  From 
1808 through 1860, the Royal Navy’s West African Counter-Slavery 
Squadron,25 also known as the “Preventative Squadron,” working under 
various complex treaty regimes, stopped, boarded, inspected, and seized 
merchant slave ships.  As a result of active interdictions, forfeitures, and 
generous cash bounties for liberated slaves, trans-Atlantic maritime slav-
ery was rendered commercially impracticable well before the mid-
nineteenth century.  Active suppression efforts also included blockading 
slave ports and estuaries26 as well as occasional riverine forays against 
slave holding facilities (i.e. “barracons”).27 Between the risks of intercep-
tion at sea, confiscation, or even capital punishment on land, dedicated 
slave ships essentially disappeared from Atlantic waters.  It is estimated 
that between 1820 and 1860, fewer than 10,000 African slaves were im-
ported (smuggled) into the United States, and most of these were trans-
ported from Haiti or other Caribbean ports.28  An examination of the his-
torical measures taken to suppress maritime slave trading may provide 
solutions to the piracy issues of today.  This Article recommends a simi-
lar policy of active interdiction and seizure. 
                                                
 24. Gordon Lubold, USS Nicholas Captures Somali Pirates. What to do with Them? THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 1, 2010, at 6, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Military/2010/0401/USS-Nicholas-captures-Somali-pirates.-What-to-do-with-them. 
 25. See generally CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, THE NAVY AND THE SLAVE TRADE (1968). 
 26. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITES 
STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870 (Penn. State Univ. Electronic Classics Series, 1896), available at 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/webdubois/duboissuppressionslavetrade6x9.pdf. 
 27. In 1840, then Commander Joseph Denman R.N. (later Admiral Denman) undertook an 
expedition up the Gallinas River (present day Sierra Leone) to liberate slaves awaiting transporta-
tion. Unfortunately, the Spanish owners brought suit in admiralty against Denman. Although found 
not liable many years later, the Queen’s Advocate issued an opinion the next year advising against 
further blockades or landings under international law. See Jenny S. Martinez, Slave Trade on Trial: 
Lessons of a Great Human Rights Law Success, BOSTON REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007. 
 28. The best known case involved the ship La Amistad is United States v. Libellants and 
Claimants of the Schooner Amistad (The Amistad), 40 U.S. 518 (1841). 
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II. THE SUPPRESSION OF MARITIME SLAVE TRADING (1808–1860) 
During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), British warships lawful-
ly boarded and inspected suspected slave vessels in order to determine 
whether they were belligerents or lawful prizes of war.29 After 1815, ap-
plicable international law did not permit the Royal Navy to stop foreign-
flagged ships, even those suspected of piracy.30  Nevertheless, under the 
Treaties of Paris, Kiel, and Ghent in 1814, as well as the Congress of 
Vienna (1815) and in separate treaties with Portugal and Spain in 1817, 
slave inspections continued with certain limitations.31  In 1824, British 
domestic law defined slaving as piracy, subject to the penalty of death.32  
Early enforcement efforts, especially with Spanish, Portuguese, Brazili-
an, and American vessels, were complicated by treaty terms and re-
strictions that limited seizures to those vessels carrying slaves.  As could 
be expected, slave ships under duress would throw captured slaves over-
board to drown in order to avoid arrest and forfeitures. In reaction, sub-
sequently negotiated treaty amendments between prosecuting states add-
ed “equipment clauses” allowing warship seizures of vessels with hatch 
gratings, shackles, excessive water kegs, and large quantities of food-
stuffs such as millet or rice.33 Relying upon overwhelming maritime 
dominance, as well as economic subsidies and trade concessions, Britain 
engaged in unending diplomatic efforts throughout the nineteenth centu-
ry to ban the slave trade and allow inspections and seizures of flagged 
vessels from Europe or the Americas that were suspected of transporting 
slaves. 
Both complementing and paralleling British anti-slavery legislation, 
prior to the nineteenth century, the U. S. government had used its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause34 to enact domestic legislation banning 
maritime slave trade aboard American ships.  The Slave Trade Act of 
179435 prohibited the outfitting of American-flagged vessels for trans-
porting slaves.  The Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 180736 
                                                
 29. See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights, 
117 YALE L. J. 550 (2008). 
 30. Le Louis, (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464; see also Tara Helfman, The Court of Vice Admiralty 
at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of the West African Slave Trade, 115 YALE L. J. 1122, 1151 
(2006). 
 31. HANNIS TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 236 (1901). 
 32. Slave Trade Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 113 (Eng.). 
 33. OFFICE OF LORD HIGH ADMIRAL, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDERS OF HER 
MAJESTY’S SHIPS AND VESSELS EMPLOYED IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE (1844). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. 
 35. Slave Trade Act of 1794, 1 Stat. 348. 
 36. The Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807, 2 Stat. 426 (1807), signed into law by 
President Thomas Jefferson on March 2, 1807, did not take effect until January 1, 1808 (the first date 
authorized under Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution). 
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banned all further importation of slaves into the continental United 
States, and the 1820 Supplement to the Piracy Act of 1819 defined slav-
ery as “piracy.”37 The Supplement further authorized the President to 
employ the U.S. Navy to “to seize all vessels navigated under our flag 
engaged in that trade.”38  Under U.S. law, foreign ships found with slaves 
in American waters could be seized as lawful prizes, and even domestic 
vessels transporting slaves from one American port to another were re-
quired to register “negro or mullato” passengers with port authorities.39 
Not only were slave traders “pirates,” they were subject to being hanged 
as pirates.40 Well before the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 184241 be-
tween Britain and the United States, maritime slaving was not merely 
unlawful commerce, but a fully developed jus cogens principle of inter-
national law.42 
As “pirate ships,” suspected slave vessels could lawfully be stopped 
and inspected in international waters by warships from any nation under 
“the customs and usages of civilized nations.”43  Obviously, without the 
lawful authority to actually board and inspect suspected slave ships, na-
val containment efforts of the African coast, by either Great Britain or 
the United States, would have been fruitless. 
III. CURRENT LIMITATIONS TO SEIZURES OF PIRATE VESSELS 
Longstanding customary international law and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)44 protect the principles of 
freedom of navigation and innocent passage. Except by special conven-
tion, or in time of war, interference by military vessels with commercial 
vessels engaged in lawful pursuits violates the sovereignty of the flag 
                                                
 37. An Act to Continue in Force: An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and 
Punish the Crime of Piracy, Pub. L. No. 16-13, 3 Stat. 600 (1820). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Slave Trade Act of 1794, 1 Stat. 348. 
 40. The only known case of the death penalty being imposed upon an American slave-ship 
master occurred in February, 1862, when Captain Nathaniel Gordon was executed in New York 
City. President Lincoln denied Gordon’s request for clemency (most likely) because, in order to 
reduce the risks of on-board revolts, Gordon’s cargo was composed overwhelmingly of women and 
children. See HOWARD JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD: THE SAGA OF A SLAVE REVOLT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN ABOLITION, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY (1997). 
 41. See Wilbur Devereux Jones, The Influence of Slavery on the Webster-Ashburton Negotia-
tions, 22 J. S. HIST. 48 (1956). 
 42. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). See generally 
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE LAW AMONG NATIONS 287-289, (5th Ed. 1981). 
 43. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 44. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after UNCLOS]. Although the United States is not a state party to UNCLOS, the United States is 
bound by customary international law, including specifically navigational provisions of the treaty 
which merely reflect or restate customary (and binding) international law. 
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state of the vessel in question.45  While UNCLOS provides for the right 
of states to suppress (and prosecute) piracy occurring in international 
waters,46 any interference by warships on the high seas must be exercised 
with scrupulous regard to the rights of other sovereign states and their 
citizens thereon.  Articles 105 (and 107) of UNCLOS authorize naval 
vessels to seize pirate vessels and make arrests on the high seas (or out-
side the flag nation’s jurisdiction), but only if another (merchant) ship 
has been “taken by piracy” or is “under the control of pirates.”47  Article 
110(2), authorizes the boarding of ships and inspections of papers and 
cargo, but no provision of Article 110 actually authorizes seizure or cap-
ture of suspected pirate vessels even when armed and equipped for no 
other viable purpose except piracy.48 
The United Nations Security Council has already determined on 
several occasions that Somali piracy is “a threat to international peace 
and security” under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter.49  Article 
42 specifically provides for “such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations 
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”50  Security 
Council Resolution 181651 authorized designated state parties to engage 
in hot pursuit as well as to enter and patrol Somali territorial waters “in a 
manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with re-
spect to piracy under relevant international law.”52 Security Council Res-
olution 1851 authorized “all necessary measures that are appropriate in 
Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery 
                                                
 45. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Owners of the Jessie, the Thomas F. Bayard, and 
the Pescawha (Great Britain) v. United States (Dec. 2, 1921), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_VI/57-60_Jessie.pdf. 
 46. UNCLOS, supra note 43, art. 105. 
 47. Id. at n.58. 
 48. See generally DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, TREATY JURISDICTION OVER PIRATES: A 
COMPILATION OF LEGAL TEXTS WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTES (2009), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/195470/Treaty_Jurisdiction_over_Pirates_A_Compilation_of_Legal_Text
s_with_Introductory_Notes. 
 49. Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression, U.N. 
Charter, Ch. VII. 
 50. Id. art. 42 (emphasis added). 
 51. Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery Off Somalia Coast, Authorizes 
for Six Months ‘All Necessary Means’ to Repress Such Acts, S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 
(June 2, 2008); see also Matthew C. Houghton, Walking the Plank: How United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1816, While Progressive, Fails to Provide a Comprehensive Solution to Somali 
Piracy, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253 (2009). 
 52. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 51, at 3. 
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at sea.”53  On these principles, Security Council authorization could easi-
ly expand current authority to encompass the right of designated state 
parties (i.e., those already engaged in counter-piracy operations) to “in-
spect and seize” vessels found “armed, equipped and prepared” for pirat-
ical attacks on the high seas (or even within Somali waters, with the con-
sent of that government). Appropriately staffed and qualified independ-
ent juridical tribunals could protect due process rights by determining 
whether seized vessels should be forfeited or destroyed or whether and 
when compensation is paid to innocent parties.  Furthermore, as Security 
Council Resolutions are normally limited in time, place, and manner of 
implementation, there would be no concomitant need to modify existing 
treaties or seek clarification between conflicting definitions of “piracy” 
under various treaties or customary international law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unless multi-national naval forces, acting under United Nations 
mandates, are allowed to inspect and seize (or scuttle54) pirate vessels 
armed, equipped, and prepared for piracy (i.e., modern-era ‘equipment 
clauses’55) piratical activities in the Indian Ocean will never be fully, or 
at least effectively, suppressed.  While criminalization and prosecution of 
pirates (regionally and domestically)56—especially of those who have 
engaged in violence—should remain an important international concern, 
putting every Somali pirate in jail is unrealistic as well as impractical.  
On the other hand, seized vessels, especially larger sea-going mother-
ships, are difficult and expensive for pirates to replace.  Like the slave 
ship seizures of the nineteenth century, without their Zodiac boats and 
mother-ships, Somali pirates would be forced to revert to traditional fish-
ing or simply stay on shore.   By taking a diplomatic lead in this field, the 
United States could facilitate an effective multi-national regime under 
United Nations auspices capable of clearing the Indian Ocean of pirates 
and sea robbers. 
                                                
 53. Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia as Part of the 
Fight Against Piracy off the Coast, Unanimously Adoption 1851, S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
 54. Even before the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy was ordered to destroy ships 
after valuation and condemnation by Prize Courts because they were most often repurchased, refitted 
and returned to sea for slaving. See TOM HENDERSON WELLS, THE SLAVE SHIP WANDERER (1967). 
 55. See generally Leslie Bethel, The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transat-
lantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century, 7 JOUR. AFR. HIST. 79 (1966). 
 56. Kevin H. Govern, National Solutions to an International Scourge: Prosecuting Piracy 
Domestically as a Viable Alternative to International Tribunals, 19 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 1 (2011). 
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America’s extensive intelligence capabilities and technologies such 
as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft could leverage this force at greatly 
reduced costs. Cooperative ships-boarding efforts could be modeled up-
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